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In closely-held corporations, the owners of a signifi-
cant amount of shares sometimes try to avert an
impending bankruptcy by informally extending a
loan, in the hope of financing a successful rescue
attempt. For creditors, the continued operations of
the company may result in a dissipation of even
more liquidation value due to perpetuated and
increased risk. For various reasons, courts and legis-
lators are sometimes inclined to subordinate such
loans in bankruptcy, or to require their treatment as
equity.
While some legal systems, such as those of the UK,
France or the Netherlands, provide for no specific
rules and regulations on loans granted by sharehold-
ers to their companies in distress, the treatment of
such loans varies significantly among countries using
such a concept, which include Germany, Austria,
Italy, Spain and the US. The basic idea can be out-
lined as follows: When the financial situation of a
company deteriorates,third party loans may become
unavailable at some point. If business operations
cannot be continued without immediate cash supply,
shareholders basically see themselves confronted
with a double set of alternatives: First, they have to
decide whether or not to liquidate their company. If
they decide to continue their business, the second
choice concerns the question whether to provide
funds in form of equity or to grant loans. If they
decide to grant loans and the company goes bank-
rupt nonetheless, statutory subordination excludes
them from equal participation in the proceeds of the
estate.In practice,they normally suffer a total loss.In
turn, third party creditors, whose interests were not
taken into account in the decision to continue oper-
ations,but who very well bear its consequences,prof-
it twofold: Ex post, their quota in the proceeds
increases inasmuch as the shareholders’ claims are
subordinated. Ex ante, they may benefit from the
negative incentive deriving from imminent subordi-
nation to the extent it prevents shareholders from
granting loans to companies that are potentially not
capable of surviving. Under certain conditions, how-
ever, the incentive may be too weak or even coun-
terproductive.
This paper proceeds as follows: The next section
gives a comparative overview of how shareholder
loans are treated by the law in a number of
European jurisdictions and in the United States.
Afterwards an economic perspective on subordina-
tion and its incentive effects on the basis of a model
written by one of the authors is presented. It will be
explained why the effects of subordination may
sometimes be counterproductive. The last section
offers some reflections on legal policy and possibili-
ties of reform relating to the field.
Comparative overview
Extension of a loan during crisis
According to the traditional judicial understanding
of German “Kapitalersatzrecht”, a shareholder loan
will be requalified if it was granted in the course of a
crisis. This criterion implies that the company was
either insolvent (illiquid1 or over-indebted2) or at
least “unworthy” of credit. The latter is assumed
when no third party creditor is willing to extend
credit at market conditions, so that the company
would have to be dissolved immediately.3 Though
more useful than the statutory definition given by
the German GmbHG,4 defining the crisis as a finan-
cial situation in which a shareholder, acting like a
responsible business man, would provide equity, this
reference to market conditions is problematic, as
there is more to the credit market than standard
products. The creditworthiness rather depends on
the borrower’s capacity to pay the interest rates a
(standard or non-standard) lender would deem ade-
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1 E.g.BGH,14.12.1959 – II ZR 187/57 (“Lufttaxi”),BGHZ 31,258,
271 et seq.; BGH, 23.2. 2004 – II ZR 2007/01, ZIP 2004, 1049.
2 BGH, 14.12.1959 – II ZR 187/57 (“Lufttaxi”), BGHZ 31, 258, 271
et seq.
3 E.g. BGH, 24.3.1980 – II ZR 213/77, BGHZ 76, 326, 330 = ZIP
1980, 361, 362; BGH, 13.7.1981 – II ZR 256/79, BGHZ 81, 253, 262
f. = ZIP 1981, 974, 978; BGH, 12.7.1999 – II ZR 87/98 = ZIP 1999,
1524; BGH, 23.2. 2004 – II ZR 207/01 = ZIP 2004, 1049.
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quate to cover his credit costs, to allow for an ade-
quate yield and – most of all – to compensate the
increased risk of default (risk premium) (Table 1).
Whereas Austria avoids these difficulties by replac-
ing the creditworthiness criterion with the rebut-
table presumption of a crisis if the equity ratio is
below eight percent and the hypothetical debt
redemption period (“fiktive Schuldentilgungs-
dauer”) exceeds fifteen years,5 the recent reform
proposal issued by the German government6 (the
“MoMiG”) considers abandoning the criterion of
lacking creditworthiness following the example of
Spain.7 This would result in an extension of statuto-
ry subordination to all shareholder loans, irrespec-
tive of when and under what circumstances they
were granted.8 While the current German concept,
due to the similar treatment of loans granted and
loans not withdrawn in the crisis (“Stehenlassen”),9
constitutes an incentive to timely withdraw loans in
order to avoid their re-qualification, thereby accel-
erating the demise of the company and thus mini-
mizing potential damages to third party creditors
resulting from continued business of companies pre-
sumably not capable of surviving, the newly pro-
posed concept would create an opposite incentive:
In order not to provoke an immediate insolvency
resulting in a total loss of all their claims due to their
statutory subordination, shareholders would gener-
ally be induced to remain inactive, in the mere hope
of an eventual recovery of their company.A similar
revision was considered, but abandoned in the US
during the 1970s.10
Italy, whose regulation explicitly rests upon the cur-
rent German concept,11 subordinates shareholder
loans only if the provision of equity has been rea-
sonable12 or if – under due consideration of the busi-
ness activity of the company – there is a significant
mismatch between equity and debt (material under-
capitalization13). With this reference, Italy comes
closest to the US equitable subordination doctrine:
According to the three part test developed by the
Court of Appeals of the 5th Circuit in re Mobile
Steel Co.,14 equitable subordination requires:
• an inequitable conduct on the part of the credi-
tor;15
• an injury to creditors or an unfair advantage
caused by this conduct; and
• consistency of subordination with the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code.
Undercapitalization is one of the most important
cases of inequitable conduct.
A more recent, less settled development of US
courts is the recharacterization doctrine, under
which some bankruptcy courts have decided to treat
debt owed to shareholders as equity.16  Recha-
racterization does not require inequitable conduct
on behalf of the creditor, but uses an eleven-factor
test,17 which includes, among others the inadequacy
of capitalization and the corporation’s inability to
obtain financing from outside lenders.18
Exemptions
Basically, there are two types of conditions under
which shareholder loans may be exempt from subor-
dination:
• Personal exemptions based on limited participa-
tion in the company in terms of equity and man-
agement responsibility;
• Factual exemptions based on the prospects of suc-
cess of the rescue attempt as part of which the
loan is granted.
5 § 2 EKEG (Austrian Eigenkapitalersatz-Gesetz).
6 Bundesregierung (2007).
7 Art. 92 no. 5.° in connection with. art. 93 no. 2 and 158 of the
Spanish Bankruptcy Code (“Ley Concursal“, LC), entered in force
on 1.9.2004; Huber & Habersack (2006), pp. 315–16, with further
references.
8 Cf.the proposed new wording of the §§ 39 and 135 of the German
Insolvency Code (“Insolvenzordnung”, InsO). The proposal is
based on the consideration that due to the court practice regarding
the so-called “Stehenlassen“ (this section below) the point in time
when creditworthiness sets in is of little practical relevance. In
restrospect, all shareholder loans are qualified either as having
been granted during crisis, or as having been left within the com-
pany after the onset of crisis (cf. Bundesregierung 2007, p 130).
9 This section below.
10 See Clark (1986), p. 69 [referring to the bills H.R. 31, S. 236, 94th
Cong.,1st Sess.(1975) (Bankruptcy Commission’s bill) and H.R.32.
S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Bankruptcy Judges’ Bill)].
11 Haas (2004), p. 562, at note 58, with further references.
12 Cf. the statutory ordinance (“Decreto legislativo”), Gazzetta
Ufficiale n. 6, 17.1.2003, Supplemento Ordinario n. 8 (“Riforma
organica della disciplina delle società di capitali e società coopera-
tive,in attuazione della legge 3 ottobre 2001,n.366”),and art.2467
of the (redrafted) Civil Code (“Codice Civile“, CC).
13 Tantini (2004), p. 798.
14 In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 699–700 (5th Cir. 1977).
Older seminal cases include Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric
(“Deep Rock”), 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939).
15 “Inequitable conduct is that conduct which may be lawful, yet
shakes one’s good conscience.”Cf.e.g.the opinions In re Beverages
Int’l Ltd., 50 B.R. 273, 281 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985), and In re Mayo,
112 B.R. 607, 650 (Bankr. D.Vt. 1990).
16 E.g.In re Cold Harbor,204 B.R.904 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1997);In re
Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., Inc., 438 F.Supp. 726
(E.D.Va.1977).
17 Roth Steel Tube Co.v.Comm’r of Internal Revenue,800 F.2d 625,
630 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726 (6th
Cir.2001);In re Outbound Marine Corp.,2003 WL 216973571 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (adding two more factors).
18 An overview is provided by Skeel & Krause-Vilmar (2006), pp.
264 et seq.Personal exemptions are provided for by the laws of
Germany,19 Austria,20 and  Spain.21 US bankruptcy
law distinguishes between insiders22 and outsiders,
depending on the respective degree of control,which
is crucial for the criterion of inequitable conduct:
While the subordination of outsider claims requires
gross misconduct, this additional element is not
required for insiders.
An exemption of the second type is provided by the
laws of Germany23 and  Austria.24 In the US, the
requirement of inequitable conduct has similar effects.
Legal consequences
Again, two major approaches can be identified:
• Requalification: The so-called “corporate law (or
preventive) concept” treats shareholder loans as
equity insofar as they must not be repaid to the
extent the sum of the company’s liabilities and
stated capital exceeds the total value of its
assets.25 Excessive repayments must be refunded.
Requalification takes effect before, and persists
after the opening of the insolvency proceedings.
• Subordination: Claims for repayment of share-
holder loans are subordinated in (but not exclud-
ed from) insolvency proceedings. Repayments
obtained in a critical period before the opening of
the insolvency proceedings must be reimbursed.
Since subordination is subject to the opening of
insolvency proceedings, it is sometimes referred
to as the “insolvency law (or reactive) concept”.
While in Germany both concepts exist in parallel,26
the  Austrian system qualifies as a combination of
both.27 Spain28 and Italy29 have implemented subor-
dination.
In the US, a claim may be equitably subordinated (as
debt) in accordance with the Mobile Steel Co. three
point test only to the extent deemed necessary by
the court to offset injury or damage caused to credi-
tors by the debtor’s inequitable conduct, while the
(amended) eleven point recharacterization test is
used to identify a financial contribution as equity
instead of debt.Accordingly,a recharacterized loan is
subordinated in full “as a proprietary interest
because the corporation repays capital contributions
only after satisfying all other obligations of the cor-
poration”.30 Consequently, recharacterization of a
claim precludes its equitable subordination.31
Loans granted before but left after the onset of
the crisis
German case law subordinates not only shareholder
loans granted in distress, but also those granted
before,but not reclaimed immediately after the onset
of the crisis, provided the creditor was (i) aware of it
and (ii) able to either withdraw the loan or initiate
liquidation (so-called “Stehenlassen”).32 These extra
requirements do not apply if the loan was granted or
promised before, but already with a view to a possi-
ble future crisis (“Finanzplankredit”).33 The Italian
doctrine (“versamento in conto capitale”) is some-
what similar, as it allows the requalification of funds
designated as loans based on the circumstances exist-
ing on the day of their granting or even later.34 As
described above, US law can have similar effects.
While Spain, due to the absence of a creditworthiness
(or similar) criterion,has no need for any such special
provision,35 Austria explicitly limits requalification to
loans granted during crisis.36
Further countries
Specific provisions regarding the subordination of
shareholder loans granted in distress can also be
found in Greek, Portuguese, Slovenian and  Polish
law.37 By contrast,in Switzerland, there are no provi-
sions to that effect.A reform proposal to add a sub-
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19 § 32a(3), 2nd sentence GmbHG; see also §§ 39(1) no. 5, 39(5) of
the proposed revisions to the Insolvency Act (Bundesregierung
2007).
20 § 5 EKEG.
21 Art. 93(2) LC.
22 Cf. the definition in Bankruptcy Code § 101(31).
23 § 32a(3) 3rd sentence GmbHG; see also §§ 39(1) no. 5, 39(4) of
the proposed revisions to the Insolvency Act (Bundesregierung
2007).
24 § 13 EKEG.
25 See e.g. Cahn (2006), p. 289.
26 Requalification is based on § 30(1) and § 31(1) GmbHG; subor-
dination follows from § 32a(1) GmbHG and § 135 InsO. The
MoMiG draft (Bundesregierung 2007) abolishes the corporate law
concept.
27 § 14 EKEG.The full amount of the loan is locked in (not only to
the extent needed to cover stated capital) immediately upon its
granting in crisis, and must not be repaid before restructuring is
completed.Earlier repayments constitute an immediate reimburse-
ment claim.However,the effect in insolvency is only subordination
(§ 57a(1) KO [Austrian Insolvency Act]).
28 Art. 92 no. 5.° in connection with art. 93 and 158 LC.
29 Art. 2467 CC.
30 Nozemack (1999), pp. 689 and 719. Recharacterization cases
“turn on whether a debt actually exists, not on whether the claim
should be equitably subordinated” (Id. at p. 716); In re Autostyle
Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2001).
31 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2001).
32 BGH,26.11.1979 – II ZR 104/77,BGHZ 75,334,336 et seq.= ZIP
1980, 115. This case law practice would become obsolete if the
MoMiG draft (Bundesregierung 2007) was enacted in its current
version.
33 E.g. BGH, 17.11.1997 – II ZR 225/96, ZIP 1998, 243.
34 Cf. Haas (2004), pp. 560 et seq., with further references.
35 See this section above.
36 § 3(1)(3) EKEG.
37 Huber & Habersack (2006), pp. 314–16; Haas (2004), p. 561;
Wachter, pp. 717 and 725, all with further references.CESifo DICE Report 2/2007 45
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ordination provision in the course of a recent revi-
sion was abandoned,38 while the Swiss Federal Court
has recently held that the legal concept of requalifi-
cation is unknown to Swiss law.Whether or not sub-
ordination could take place instead has been left
open.39 Roughly spoken, the prevailing Swiss doc-
trine, however, acknowledges a legal subordination
under conditions similar to those in Germany.40
An economic perspective
The policy rationale behind subordination of share-
holder loans has been disputed for several years.The
German discussion has gained some fierceness
recently and has been fuelled by the recent reform
proposal.41 From an economic perspective, the
incentive effects created by the doctrine stand at the
core of the debate.42 In fact, most economic analysis
has emphasized that subordination creates a disin-
centive against legitimate rescue attempts, as share-
holders will not obtain an insolvency quota if the res-
cue attempt financed by the shareholder loan fails.43
The economic intuition in favour of subordination is
that shareholders will often gamble for resurrection,
resulting in a high risk of dissipation of the remain-
ing corporate funds.44 Hence, legal consequences
should deter such conduct. However, rescue at-
tempts financed by shareholder loans are not neces-
sarily negative.From an ex ante perspective,a rescue
attempt has a certain probability of success, the ben-
efits of which are in part borne by the firm’s original
creditors, who will obtain full repayment.
The first comprehensive model of subordination of
shareholder loans in bankruptcy that measures the
doctrine against an efficiency gauge was proposed by
Gelter (2006). The model assumes that the company
has entered into an unforeseen crisis, when its share-
holders must decide either to let the company go into
liquidation or to add more capital to the firm in the
form of a shareholder loan, which is used to finance a
rescue attempt. This project may either result in suc-
cess, in which case the total value of the company –
composed of the total of both the creditors’ claims
and shareholder value – increases, or it may result in
failure, which means that the firm still has to be liqui-
dated, but at a potentially lower liquidation value.
The model takes the normative perspective that the
relevant legal doctrine should maximize the total
expected wealth of shareholders and creditors com-
bined.However,because of the debt overhang prob-
lem famously described by Myers (1977), the inter-
ests of shareholders and creditors strongly diverge in
a near-bankruptcy situation. In other words, share-
holders have the incentive to take risks from which
they benefit to a larger degree than creditors,or that
are outright detrimental to creditors.The reason for
this divergence is that if the rescue attempt succeeds,
most of the benefits will typically accrue to share-
holders, whose profits (from the increased value of
the firm) are not constrained by an upward bound-
ary. By contrast, creditors’ gains in expected value
are limited by their fixed claim. It follows that a
shareholder who has the opportunity to increase the
risk of the firm by prolonging its existence by means
of a shareholder loan often will have an incentive to
enact such a rescue attempt, although it may not be
efficient for shareholders’ and creditors’ expected
wealth combined.
It is intuitive that subordination of shareholder loans
exerts a numbing effect on this incentive. However,
whether the doctrine creates such a disincentive has
nothing to do with whether the rescue would be ex
ante efficient. Gelter’s (2006) model is the first to
show mathematically under what circumstances the
results yielded by the incentives modified by subor-
dination diverge from the first-best solution.A clos-
er investigation reveals that there are essentially the
four possible effects shown in Table 2.
38Art.697i and 807c of the pre-draft for the revision of the LLC law
(“Vorentwurf für die Reform des GmbH-Rechts“); cf. Böckli et al.
(1996), pp. 32 and 82.
39 BGer., 2.3.2006 – 5C.230/2005, E. 3.
40 Böckli (2004), § 13, N 779.
41 Bundesregierung 2007.
42 By contrast, one of the leading academic advocates of the doc-
trine has rejected economic analysis and stated that the purpose of
the doctrine was “to create an equilibrium of financial freedom and
responsibility in view of creditor protection”, and “on this basis,
rules of the game for legitimate measures of funding and restruc-
turing – and truly not for their obstruction” (Schmidt 2006, p. 1926
[own translation]).
43 See Götz (2001), pp. 109 et seq.; Engert (2004), pp. 826 et seq.
44 See Klaus (1994), pp. 360 et seq.; Engert (2004), pp. 821–22.
Table 2 
Possible effects of subordinationof shareholder 















not prevented by sub-
ordination (type I error)
 Source: Compilation of the authors.Quite obviously, subordination would be most desir-
able if it led exclusively to incentives against all inef-
ficient rescue attempts,but not against efficient ones.
However, mathematical analysis shows that all four
possibilities exist. Under certain circumstances, the
deterrent power of subordination will be too small to
prevent inefficient rescue attempts (type I error: no
effect),while under others,it will deter efficient ones
(type II error: counterproductive effect).
This has some important implications:
Regarding type I errors: Gelter (2006) shows that no
general statement on the sufficiency of the deterrent
effect of subordination can be made. As long as the
conditions of a specific case are such that the poten-
tial subordination of the shareholders’ claims is
insufficient to neutralize their expected benefits
from a risky rescue attempt, some inefficient rescue
attempts will still take place.In cases with less poten-
tial for hazardous business continuation to the
(potential) detriment of third party creditors, how-
ever,the incentive may be strong enough.Hence,the
incentive deriving from the impending subordina-
tion cannot fully, but at least partly, discourage
shareholders from inefficient continuation of their
business or inefficient rescue attempts. It follows
that the argument, according to which the large bulk
of case law produced by the German “Kapitaler-
satzrecht” doctrine indicates that subordination has
no deterrent effect,45 is not compelling.
Moreover, as subordination is sometimes an insuffi-
cient deterrent, it will often be desirable to provide
liability of management (or shareholders providing
shareholder loans) for belated filing for bankruptcy
in order to create an incentive against undesirable
rescue attempts (ex ante) and to cover the third
party creditors’ damage resulting from continued
operations of the firm.
Regarding type II errors:As Gelter (2006) shows,the
possibility of type II errors supports the thesis that
subordination can have a detrimental deterrent
effect, as subordination as such does not achieve
exclusively desirable results. From a theoretical per-
spective, shareholder loans should only be subordi-
nated where they are used to finance inefficient res-
cue attempts, i.e. business continuations that reduce
the expected total value of the firm. Hence, the
delineation of the scope of applicability of the doc-
trine is of crucial importance. The answer to this
need could be a well-designed reorganization ex-
emption,46 allowing for a distinction of efficient from
inefficient rescue attempts.
Concluding remarks
The comparative overview has shown that there are
basically two concepts to treat shareholder loans
granted in distress.The so-called insolvency law con-
cept, according to which shareholder loans are sub-
ordinated, is on the rise. As opposed to its counter-
part, the corporate law concept, by which sharehold-
er loans are re-qualified immediately after their
granting in the crisis, it produces effects only after
the opening of the insolvency proceedings.However,
due to the anticipation of potential subordination, it
produces similar incentives ex ante. The argument
brought forward in some of the German legal litera-
ture in defense of the corporate law concept,accord-
ing to which the retention of funds is superior to hav-
ing to reclaim them, applies to (ex post) redistribu-
tion only.
Economic analysis suggests that, depending on the
circumstances of the specific case, the potential sub-
ordination of shareholder loans may or may not be an
effective instrument to prevent detrimental risk-
enhancing conduct of shareholders near bankruptcy:
While its numbing effect may discourage sharehold-
ers from socially undesirable rescue attempts in cer-
tain cases, the threat to subordinate the shareholder
claims in bankruptcy may be too weak in others.This
second group of cases calls for support through an
additional, more severe sanction. A strict manage-
ment liability for belated filing for bankruptcy could
be such a sanction if it creates a sufficient deterrent
effect on management against continuing business
without a proper restructuring plan.The UK wrongful
trading liability or the German liability for delays in
filing for insolvency could serve as examples.47At last,
there are situations in which potential subordination
is over-inclusive.This third group of cases occurs if the
deterrent effect prevents a socially beneficial rescue
attempt.Such counterproductive effects can be avoid-
ed with a complementary restructuring exemption
for ex ante promising rescue attempts.
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46 Previous section.
47 In this context cf.e.g.the amendment to §§ 6(2),64 GmbHG pro-
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Apart from the incentive effects ex ante, subordina-
tion may also be attractive to courts and legislators
for its ex post reallocation effect.While veil piercing
or management liability court proceedings involve
considerable time and effort for an often uncertain
outcome, subordination of loans may be an appeal-
ing alternative in legal systems not requiring the
insolvency administrator to show fault on the part of
the shareholder who granted the loan.This is of par-
ticular importance in cases of secured shareholder
loans, which are particularly harmful to unsecured
creditors.48 In these cases, subordination renders the
collateral invalid.
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